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Abstract: The procurement of complex projects is often plagued by large cost
overruns. One important reason for these additional costs are flaws in the initial
design. If the project is procured with a price-only auction, sellers who spotted
some of the flaws have no incentive to reveal them early. Each seller prefers to
conceal his information until he is awarded the contract and then renegotiate when
he is in a bilateral monopoly position with the buyer. We show that this gives rise
to three inefficiencies: inefficient renegotiation, inefficient production and ineffi-
cient design. We derive the welfare optimal direct mechanism that implements the
efficient allocation at the lowest possible cost to the buyer. The direct mechanism,
however, imposes strong assumptions on the buyer’s prior knowledge of possible
flaws and their payoff consequences. Therefore, we also propose an indirect me-
chanism that implements the same allocation but does not require any such prior
knowledge. The optimal direct and indirect mechanisms separate the improvement
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1 Introduction
The procurement of complex projects is often plagued by large cost overruns. One important
reason for unexpected additional costs are flaws in the initial design of the project. When
these flaws are revealed after production has started, the design of the project needs to be
changed and contracts have to be renegotiated which often leads to substantial adjustment
costs. To minimize design flaws and the resulting adjustment costs the early collaboration
with potential contractors is of crucial importance. However, if the project is procured by
a standard price-only auction, potential contractors have little incentive to contribute their
expertise. Each potential contractor who spotted a design flaw has a strong incentive to
conceal this information, bid more aggressively in the auction in order to have a better chance
to win the contract, and then – after the award of the contract – bilaterally renegotiate with
the buyer to fix the design flaw and thereby grab some of the surplus generated by the design
adjustment. A well known example is the “Big Dig” highway artery project in Boston. The
Boston Globe reports: “On more than 3,200 occasions since 1991, the state paid extra money
to contractors to compensate for design flaws, some big, some small. ... All these small errors
helped add up to something very large: $ 1.6 billion in unplanned construction costs. About
$ 1.1 billion can be traced back to deficiencies in the designs.”1
In this paper we propose an informationally robust mechanism that allocates the contract
to the seller with the lowest cost and that induces all potential sellers to reveal any information
that they may have about possible design flaws early, i.e. before the contract is assigned. In
a first step, we look for the direct mechanism that implements the efficient allocation at
1See http://archive.boston.com/news/specials/bechtel/part 1/. The article presents a “case study” to il-
lustrate the problem that fits our analysis: “On July 15, 1997, state officials gathered to award a contract to
build tunnels from Haymarket Square to North Station ... Bechtel estimated the job would cost about $ 260
million to complete ... As it turned out, the low bid came in at $ 218 million. Artery officials rejoiced. But
their joy was short-lived. Today, the contract ... has grown $ 128 million beyond the bid submitted that July
day, an increase of nearly 60 percent.” Other prominent examples of cost overruns include the new airport
in Berlin (initial cost estimate AC2.0 billion, final cost at least AC5.4 billion, project not yet completed) and
the Elbphilharmonie in Hamburg (initial cost estimate AC114 million, final cost AC789 million), see Kostka and
Fiedler (2016) for a detailed discussion. In all of these cases design flaws and costly renegotiation are only one
reason for the massive cost increases, but not the only one. Other contributors include unforeseen geological
problems, design changes due to changing regulation and changing demands of the client, bureaucratic incom-
petence, corruption, etc. It is often difficult to disentangle these effects, but industry experts frequently point
to the importance of careful design and close collaboration with potential contractors before the contract is
awarded.
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the lowest possible cost to the buyer. This optimal direct mechanism is ex post incentive
compatible, so it does not depend on the priors (and higher order beliefs) of the involved
parties about the likelihood of possible flaws and of the probabilities that these flaws have
been spotted by each of the sellers. But, a crucial drawback of this direct mechanism is that it
requires the parameters of the model to be common knowledge. In particular, the buyer has
to know the set of potential design flaws and their payoff consequences. In the procurement
context this is a very strong assumption. Buyers are often aware that the initial design may
be flawed, but they have no idea how possible flaws may look like and what their payoff
implications are. After all, if they had this information, it would be easy for them to look for
and detect the design flaws themselves.
To deal with this problem we propose an indirect mechanism that implements the efficient
allocation at the same cost to the buyer as the direct mechanism, but that does not require
any knowledge about the set of possible flaws ex ante. However, this indirect mechanism
requires that pointing out a design flaw is an “eye-opener”: Once the flaw has been pointed
out, every industry expert understands the flaw and knows how to fix it. He also knows the
payoff consequences if the flaw is fixed early rather than late. This assumption is much weaker
than the assumption that the buyer knows all potential flaws ex ante, and it seems plausible
in the procurement context. Given this assumption our indirect mechanism can make use of
an independent arbitrator. Sellers are asked to reveal all design flaws that they spotted to
the arbitrator who rewards them according to the payoff consequences these flaws would have
had if they had not been disclosed early. Thereafter the contract is allocated by a standard
second price auction to the seller with the lowest cost.
The indirect mechanism, called the “Extended Arbitration Mechanism”, is informati-
onally robust in the sense of the literature on “robust implementation” (Bergemann and
Morris, 2005), i.e. the mechanism is ex post incentive compatible and therefore belief-free.
Importantly, it is also robust in a different and complementary sense; it does not require that
the parameters of the underlying model (i.e. the set of possible flaws and their payoff conse-
quences) are common knowledge. It only requires that the buyer is aware that she may have
overlooked something, but she does not have to know what it is that she overlooked.
After discussing the relation of our paper to the literature in the next section, we set
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up a model in Section 3, where a buyer wants to procure a project that may be plagued by
design flaws. There are two potential sellers with private information about their production
costs. Each seller privately observes with some positive probability some subset of the actual
design flaws. Each seller may reveal this information to the buyer or keep it to himself. The
buyer wants to set up a procurement mechanism that implements the efficient allocation and
minimizes the information rents to the sellers. Note that this is a multi-dimensional mechanism
design problem.
In Section 4 we show that a standard price-only auction offers no incentives to sellers
to reveal private information about possible design flaws early. The reason is simple: If a
seller reveals the information before the auction takes place he gains nothing because once the
flaw has been pointed out every seller can fix it. If he waits until he has been assigned the
contract, he is in a bilateral monopoly situation with the buyer. Thus, if he now reveals the
flaw, the contract has to be renegotiated and the seller can capture some of the surplus from
renegotiation. This gives rise to three inefficiencies. First, fixing the flaw via renegotiation
is more costly than fixing it early (Inefficient Renegotiation). Two additional inefficiencies
arise if the flaw is spotted only by the seller with higher production cost. Either this seller
wins the auction – by bidding aggressively in anticipation of the renegotiation profit. In this
case production is carried out at a too high cost (Inefficient Production). Or he does not
win the auction – because the cost difference to the other seller is larger than the expected
renegotiation profit. In this case the flaw will not be pointed out and the buyer suffers from
the flawed design (Inefficient Design).
In Section 5 we focus on the first inefficiency (Inefficient Renegotiation) by assuming that
there are no cost differences between sellers and that costs are common knowledge. We also
restrict attention to the case of only one possible flaw. As a benchmark we solve the standard
mechanism design problem assuming that all parameters of the model are common knowledge.
The optimal direct mechanism minimizes the information rent that has to be paid to sellers
by assigning the contract randomly if both sellers revealed the same information. Then, we
relax the common knowledge assumption and show that there exists an equivalent indirect
mechanism – called the Arbitration Mechanism – that implements the same allocation and
does not require any prior knowledge of the set of possible flaws and their payoff consequences.
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In Section 6 we generalize these results to the case where sellers have different costs (which
is their private information) and in which there may be multiple flaws. This problem is more
intricate because efficiency requires that the seller with the lowest cost gets the contract.
Thus, the contract cannot be assigned randomly. This implies that a higher information rent
has to be paid to the sellers. We derive the ex post incentive compatible mechanism that
implements the efficient allocation at the lowest possible cost to the buyer, again assuming
that the parameters of the model are common knowledge. Then we show that there exists an
indirect, Extended Arbitration Mechanism that implements the same allocation at the same
cost and does not require prior knowledge about the underlying parameters.
An important characteristic of this mechanism is that it separates the two problems of
eliciting information about design flaws and assigning the contract to the seller with the lowest
cost. We show that this is necessary to achieve efficiency. Efficiency requires that the contract
is assigned to the seller with the lowest cost who need not be the seller who spotted most
design flaws.
So far we assumed that each seller observes some subset of the actual flaws with some
exogenously given probability. In Section 7 we generalize this model and allow for search
costs. Each seller has to actively search for possible design flaws which requires costly effort.
The optimal mechanisms of Section 6 do not offer efficient incentives to incur these costs. We
derive the optimal mechanism that induces sellers not just to reveal their information about
costs and flaws truthfully, but also to search efficiently for possible flaws. This mechanism has
to pay a higher information rent to the seller, but it is also somewhat easier to specify because
it does not depend on the bargaining power of the parties in the renegotiation game.
Section 8 concludes and discusses some possible directions of future research. All proofs
are relegated to Appendix A.
2 Relation to the Literature
Our paper contributes to three strands of the literature. First, there is a large literature on
optimal procurement auctions (McAfee and McMillan, 1986; Laffont and Tirole, 1993). The
novel feature in our set-up is that sellers may have superior information about possible design
4
flaws that the buyer would like to elicit. This is closely related to the literature on scoring
auctions (Asker and Cantillon, 2010; Che, 1993; Che, Iossa and Rey, 2016) that also try to
induce sellers to make design proposals. A scoring auction assigns the contract to the seller
who comes up with the best proposal (the highest total score). In contrast, our mechanism
combines the suggestions of several sellers to improve the design and assigns the contract for
the improved design to the seller with lowest cost.
Second, our paper is related to the literature on “robust mechanism design”. Bayesian
mechanism design theory has often been criticized because the optimal mechanism crucially
depends on the precise information that the agents and the mechanism designer have (including
their prior beliefs and higher order believes that are not observable). Wilson (1987) has pointed
out that if the agents or the designer are mistaken in their beliefs, then the outcome of the
supposedly optimal mechanism may be very different from the intended outcome. Bergemann
and Morris (2005) require that “robust implementation” is independent of beliefs and higher
order beliefs and depends only on payoff relevant types. They have shown that implementation
is robust if the mechanism satisfies ex post incentive compatibility, i.e. if the strategy of each
agent is optimal against the strategies of all other agents for every possible realization of
types.2 Our optimal mechanism satisfies ex post incentive compatibility and is therefore
“informationally robust” in this sense.
The indirect arbitration mechanism that we propose is even more robust because it does
not require any knowledge of the possible type spaces of the sellers. We are not aware of
any other papers on robust mechanism design with this feature. This result requires that an
arbitrator can evaluate the payoff consequences of detected flaws and that he can complete
the mechanism ex post. This is a novel assumption in the mechanism design literature that is
plausible in the procurement context and deserves further attention.
Finally, there is a small but growing literature on the inefficiencies of contract renegoti-
ation. Several empirical studies emphasize that renegotiation is often costly and inefficient,
including Crocker and Reynolds (1993), Chakravarty and MacLeod (2009), and Bajari, Hough-
ton and Tadelis (2014). Bajari et al. (2014, p. 1317) consider highway procurement contracts
2See Bergemann and Morris (2012) for a survey of the literature on robust implementation. Bergemann
and Morris distinguish between partial robust implementation and full robust implementation. We exclusively
consider partial robust implementation in this paper and refer to it simply as robust implementation.
5
in California. They report that renegotiation costs are substantial and estimate that they
“range from 55 cents to araound two dollars for every dollar in change”. A behavioral founda-
tion based on loss aversion for inefficient renegotiation is developed by Herweg and Schmidt
(2015). Other contributions like Bajari and Tadelis (2001) and Herweg and Schmidt (2017)
start out from the assumption that renegotiation is costly and investigate the implications.
Bajari and Tadelis (2001) compare fixed-price to cost-plus contracts and show that standardi-
zed goods should be procured by fixed-price contracts that give strong cost-saving incentives
to sellers, while complex goods should be procured by cost-plus contracts in order to avoid
costly renegotiation. Herweg and Schmidt (2017) compare price-only auctions to bilateral
negotiations. They show that negotiation with one selected seller may outperform an auction
because the auction induces sellers to conceal private information about design improvements
which gives rise to inefficient renegotiation. While these papers compare standard contracts
and procurement procedures, the current paper solves for the optimal procurement mechanism
and proposes a new procedure.
3 The Model
A buyer (B, female) wants to procure a complex good from one of two sellers (male), denoted
by i ∈ {1, 2}.3 At date 0 the buyer comes up with a design proposal D0 for the good. Seller
i can produce design D0 at cost c
i ∈ [
¯
c, c̄], 0 ≤
¯
c ≤ c̄. These costs c1 and c2 are private
information and drawn from some cdf H(c1, c2). If design D0 is optimal, it generates utility v
for the buyer. However, with some probability the design is plagued by one or multiple flaws
which reduce the buyer’s utility if design D0 is implemented. In order to restore the buyer’s
utility to v, the flaws have to be fixed by adjusting the design.
We model the possibility of design flaws as follows. Let F = {f1, . . . , fn} denote the set
of possible design flaws and let P(F) denote the power set of F , i.e. the set of all possible
subsets of F including ∅.4 A typical element of P(F) is denoted by F . F ∈ P(F) is drawn
from P(F) according to probability distribution G(F ). If F = ∅, there is no design flaw. If
3We restrict attention to the case of two sellers for notational simplicity only. It is straightforward to extend
the analysis to the case of N sellers.
4If | F | is the cardinality of F , then | P(F) |= 2|F|.
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F 6= ∅, a non-empty subset of flaws has materialized.
Sellers are better able to detect design flaws than the buyer.5 When the buyer proposes
design D0, each seller privately observes a subset of the realized flaws. Let P(F ) denote the
power set of F . Each seller observes a private signal F̂ i ∈ P(F ). If F̂ i = ∅, seller i observes
nothing. If F̂ i 6= ∅, seller i observes some non-empty subset of the set of realized flaws F . The
joint probability distribution over (F̂ 1, F̂ 2) given the set of flaws F is denoted by QF .
A seller can report only flaws that he observed, but he is free which of these flaws to
report. Let F̃ i denote the set of flaws reported by seller i, i.e., F̃ i ∈ P(F̂ i). If F̃ i = ∅, seller
i reports nothing. If F̃ i 6= ∅, seller i reports some (or all) of the flaws that he observed. His
report can be partially verified:
Assumption 1 (Partial Verifiability). Each seller i can report any subset F̃ i of the set of
flaws F̂ i that he observed (including ∅). All flaws f ∈ F̃ i can be verified. However, if fk /∈ F̃
i,
it is impossible to verify whether fk ∈ F̂
i, i.e. whether seller i did or did not observe flaw fk.
Sellers can report flaws at date 1 (“early”, before the contract is assigned) or at date 2
(“late”, after the contract has been assigned and production has started). We assume that
once a flaw has been pointed out, it can be fixed by any seller at the same cost. If a flaw fk
is fixed early (at date 1), the cost of fixing it is ∆ck ≥ 0. If it is fixed late (at date 2) the cost
increases by ∆xk ≥ 0. If fk is not fixed, the buyer’s utility is reduced to v−∆vk. We assume
that ∆vk > ∆ck +∆xk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, so fixing a flaw is always efficient, but it is more
efficient to fix it early rather than late.6 At date 2 the buyer has made already several other
commitments (contracts with other suppliers, customers, etc.) that are based on the design of
the initial contract. Furthermore, the parties may disagree on who is responsible for the design
flaw and who should bear the cost of fixing it which may lead to haggling, aggrievement, and
further delays. Thus, the surplus from fixing a flaw shrinks from Sk = ∆vk −∆ck if fk is fixed
at date 1 to SRk = ∆vk −∆ck −∆xk if fk is fixed via renegotiation at date 2.
Let D(F̃ ) denote the design that fixes all flaws fk ∈ F̃ , where F̃ = F̃
1 ∪ F̃ 2 is the set of
5After all, the sellers are the experts in producing the good. This is why the buyer turned to them in the
first place and does not produce the good herself.
6The model implicitly assumes that flaws can be fixed independently of each other. The idea is that if two
(or more) flaws interact with each other, then the discovery of one flaw will lead to the discovery of the other
connected flaws as well. Thus, we treat a set of interdependent flaws as a single flaw.
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flaws that have been reported to the buyer at date 1. If the set of actual flaws is F , F̃ ⊆ F ,
then the gross utility of the buyer derived from design D(F̃ ) is given by




while the cost of the seller to produce D(F̃ ) is




We assume that v is sufficiently large so that the buyer always wants to procure the good no
matter how many flaws there are and when they are reported.7
Note that a seller may have an incentive to report a flaw late even though this raises
the cost of fixing it. The reason is that he cannot simply “sell” his information to the buyer
at date 1. Anybody can claim that there is a flaw. To prove his claim a seller has to point
out what the flaw is, but once he does so, he gives his information away and the buyer no
longer needs to pay for it (see Arrow (1962) for the seminal discussion of this problem). The
situation changes at date 2; i.e., after the contract has been assigned to one of the sellers (the
“contractor” C).8 If the contractor reveals a flaw to the buyer now, the buyer cannot simply
change the design in order to fix the flaw but has to renegotiate the initial contract with the
contractor. Now the parties are in a bilateral monopoly position, and the contractor gets some
share of the surplus from renegotiation.
We model the renegotiation game in reduced form by applying the Generalized Nash
Bargaining Solution (GNBS). The threatpoint of the renegotiation game is that renegotiation
fails and that the initial contract is carried out. Let α ∈ (0, 1) denote the bargaining power of
the buyer. Then the seller’s payoff from renegotiating flaw fk at date 2 is given by (1−α)S
R
k .
If a flaw fk, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, exists but is not reported (either because no seller observed it
or because a seller who observed it did not report it), then the flaw becomes apparent at date
3 when the project is (to a large degree) completed. If the buyer wants to change the design
now, she can write a new contract with a (potentially) new seller. At this stage all sellers
are equally good at fixing the problem and the initial contract no longer binds the buyer to
7A sufficient condition for this to be the case is V (D0)−
∑
k|fk∈F
∆vk − c > 0.
8This is what Williamson (1985, p. 61-63), has termed the “fundamental transformation”.
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seller i. We do not model this stage explicitly but assume that if this stage is reached, flaw fk
reduces the net utility of the buyer by ∆vk.
Finally, we posit that sellers are protected by limited liability, i.e. they can always declare
bankruptcy to avoid making negative profits. If a contractor declares bankruptcy, the buyer is
no longer obligated to deal with this seller and can switch to another seller who can complete
the project at the same cost.
The time structure of the model is summarized as follows.
Date 0: The buyer B announces that she wants to procure a good with design D0. Nature
determines the set of actual flaws F drawn from P(F) according to cdf G(F ), the set of
flaws F̂ i that are observed by each seller i ∈ {1, 2} according to cdf QF , and each seller’s
cost type ci drawn from [
¯
c, c̄] according to cdf H(c1, c2).
Date 1: A procurement mechanism is proposed by B and executed. The mechanism may ask
sellers to reveal their types (ci, F̂ i). Given the set of all reported flaws F̃ = F̃ 1 ∪ F̃ 2 it
determines the design D(F̃ ) of the good, which seller i becomes the contractor C, and
which payments are made.
Date 2: B and C may engage in contract renegotiation if the contractor observed a flaw that
has not been revealed at stage 1.
Date 3: The project is completed and payoffs are realized.







0 1 2 3
t
B announces D0,
ci, F , F̂ i determined,
i observes (ci, F̂ i)
Mechanism:
i reports (c̃i, F̃ i),





Figure 1: Time structure
Discussion of modeling assumptions:
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1. Common knowledge of the information structure. The mechanism design literature ty-
pically assumes that the informational structure of the underlying game is common
knowledge of all players, i.e. all players know the set of possible flaws F and the proba-
bility distributions G(F ), QF (F̂
1, F̂ 2), and H(c1, c2). In our set-up this does not make
much sense. A sophisticated buyer may be aware that flaws may exist in the initial
design, but she doesn’t know how these flaws look like, otherwise she could find them
herself.
To deal with this problem we proceed in two steps. In the first step, we follow the
standard mechanism design literature by assuming that the structure of the game is
common knowledge and solve for the efficient, cost-minimizing mechanism. This yields
a benchmark for what the buyer can achieve if she is very well informed. In a second
step, we relax the informational requirements and assume that neither the buyer nor the
sellers know the set of possible flaws nor the underlying probability distribution. We
show that there exists an indirect mechanism that implements the efficient allocation at
the same cost to the buyer as the efficient, cost-minimizing mechanism of step 1.
2. Flaws versus design improvements. In the model we always talk about flaws. A seller
may also discover a design improvement that raises the utility of the buyer by more than
the additional cost of the seller. It is straightforward to extend to model to this case.
However, the value of a design improvement is often subjective and impossible to verify,
while the cost of fixing a flaw is more objective and more easily assessed by an outsider.
We will get back to this distinction in Section 5.2 where it plays an important role for
the Arbitration Mechanism proposed there.
3. Timing of the discovery of flaws. The model assumes that sellers observe flaws at date
0 only, i.e. before the contract is assigned. Thus, if the contractor reports a flaw at date
2 in order to renegotiate, the buyer knows that the seller must have known this flaw
early on. In the real world not all flaws are discovered early but some are discovered
late. It would be straightforward (but notationally cumbersome) to extend the model
by allowing for late discoveries of design flaws as well. In this extended model a seller
who reports a design flaw late will always claim that he observed it late, and the buyer
10
cannot find out when the flaw was discovered.9 For simplicity we do not present this
extended model formally but assume that all flaws are observed at date 0. After all,
these are the flaws that we care about because we want to induce sellers to report these
flaws early in order to save the additional cost. If a flaw is discovered late, the higher
cost to fix it is unavoidable.
4. No commitment not to renegotiate. If the buyer could commit never to renegotiate, the
sellers would not be able to profit from withholding their information and they might
as well report all observed design flaws early. However, if there is an opportunity for
a Pareto improvement at date 2, the parties can always tear up the old contract and
renegotiate a new one. Furthermore, if there are design flaws that are discovered late
(as discussed above), a commitment not to renegotiate could be very harmful. We also
exclude the possibility to “design” the renegotiation game in the mechanism at date 1
such that the buyer gets all the bargaining power.10
4 Three Inefficiencies
In this section we discuss a simple example to point out the inefficiencies that arise if the
buyer näıvely uses a standard price-only auction to allocate the procurement contract. In
this example we assume that there is only one possible flaw denoted by f that exists with
probability p. If the flaw exists each seller independently observes it with probability q, i.e.
F̂ i = {f}. With probability 1 − q seller i observes nothing, so F̂ i = ∅. We also assume that
∆c = 0. Thus, if there is a design flaw and if the flaw is reported early (at date 1), then the
problem can be solved at no additional cost. However, if the flaw is reported late (at date 2)
and the parties have to renegotiate, then there is an inefficiency ∆x, with ∆v > ∆x > 0.
Suppose that the buyer uses a sealed-bid, second-price auction. If the probability of a
design flaw is 0, this auction implements the efficient allocation at the lowest possible cost for
the buyer.
9If the buyer could prove that the seller withheld the information on purpose and that he foresaw the harm
caused to the buyer, a court of law could interpret this as a violation of the seller’s “duty of care”. In the
extended version of the model proposed above this is no longer an issue.
10See Hart (1995), p. 77-78, for a detailed discussion of these issues.
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Before the auction is conducted, the buyer may ask the two sellers whether they have
detected a flaw in design D0. If none of the suppliers reports a flaw, the buyer auctions off
the procurement contract for design D0. If at least one of the suppliers reports the flaw f , the
buyer fixes the design and puts the improved design D(f) = Df up for auction.
Observation 1. Suppose the buyer uses a sealed-bid, second-price auction to allocate the
procurement contract. Then, any seller who detected flaw f has a strict incentive to conceal
this information. There is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in which each seller bids
b(ci, F̂ i) =
{




If seller 1 who observed the flaw reports this to the buyer ex ante, the adjusted design Df
is specified in the initial auction. The seller’s expected profit is the expected cost advantage –
as in a standard second-price inverse auction. If, on the other hand, seller 1 conceals the flaw
and also seller 2 does not report it, a contract for design D0 is awarded initially. Now, if seller
1 wins the contract he can make an additional profit ex post by renegotiating the contract.
This allows him to bid more aggressively in the auction. Hence, by concealing the flaw seller 1
increases the probability of winning the contract and the expected profit from being awarded
the contract. Therefore, a seller who spotted the flaw has a strict incentive to conceal this
information ex ante.
This behavior of an informed seller can trigger three inefficiencies if a price-only auction
is used. First, because the flaw is only revealed at date 2 the parties have to renegotiate with
positive probability and incur the renegotiation cost ∆x > 0. Second, if ci > cj and i observes
the flaw while j does not, it may happen that ci − (1 − α)SR < cj. In this case the seller
with the higher cost gets the contract which is inefficient – i.e., the auction does not achieve
efficient production. Finally, if ci > cj and i observes the flaw while j does not, it may happen
that ci − (1 − α)SR > cj. In this case the lower cost seller gets the contract, but the flaw is
not fixed and SR = ∆v −∆x cannot be realized.
Proposition 1 (Three Inefficiencies). Suppose the buyer uses a sealed-bid, second-price auction




q + 2(1− q)× Prob(ci − (1− α)SR < cj)
]
there is a design flaw that
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is detected by at least one seller who wins the auction. In this case the design flaw is
fixed via renegotiation which is inefficient because the parties have to incur ∆x > 0.
2. Inefficient Production:
With probability 2pq(1−q)×Prob(cj < ci < cj+(1−α)SR) there is a design flaw that is
detected by one seller, this seller has higher production costs but wins the auction because
of his expected profit in the renegotiation game. In this case production is carried out
inefficiently by the seller with the higher cost.
3. Inefficient Design:
With probability 2pq(1 − q) × Prob(cj < ci − (1 − α)SR) there is a design flaw that is
detected by one seller, but this seller does not win the auction. In this case the design
flaw is not reported to the buyer and it cannot be fixed, so the buyer has to incur the loss
of ∆v which is inefficient.
The question arises whether there is a mechanism that avoids these inefficiencies, i.e. a
mechanism that induces both sellers to report all observed design flaws at date 1 and that
always allocates the contract to the seller with the lowest cost. In the next section we focus on
the first inefficiency (Inefficient Renegotiation) by assuming that there are no cost differences
between sellers. Furthermore, we restrict attention to the case of just one possible design flaw
for notational simplicity. In Section 6 we allow for cost differences between sellers in order to
address the additional problems of Inefficient Production and Inefficient Design, and we allow
for multiple design flaws.
5 Inducing Sellers to Report a Design Flaw Early
In this section we focus on how to optimally induce sellers to report a design flaw early. We
abstract from cost differences between firms and assume that c1 = c2 = c. Furthermore, we
restrict attention to only one design flaw. We proceed in two steps. First, we assume that
the model is common knowledge. In particular we assume that the mechanism designer (the
buyer) knows the set of flaws and the underlying probability distributions. We derive a direct
mechanism that induces both sellers to reveal their private information at date 1 and that
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implements the efficient allocation at the lowest possible cost for the buyer. In the second
step we show that under an additional weak assumption there exists an indirect mechanism
that implements the same allocation but that is informationally robust in the sense that it
does not require the mechanism designer to know any of the parameters of the model when
she sets up the mechanism.
5.1 The Optimal Mechanism Design Problem
Consider the problem of a mechanism designer who knows that there is one potential flaw f
and who knows the values of v, c, ∆v, ∆c, and ∆x, and the probabilities p and q. Each seller
i ∈ {1, 2} is one of two possible types. If he did not observe a design flaw, he is (with a slight
abuse of notion) of type ∅. This is the case if either there is no flaw (in state F = ∅) or if
there is a flaw (in state F = {f}) but the seller did not observe it. If the seller observed the
flaw, he is of type f .
A direct mechanism asks each seller i to send a message F̃ i ∈ {∅, f}. In words, a seller
either claims that he did not observe anything (F̃ i = ∅) or he reports that he observed the
flaw (F̃ i = f). While message F̃ i = ∅ can always be sent, message F̃ i = f is feasible only
if supplier i indeed observed the flaw f (is of type f). This is a mechanism design problem
with “partially verifiable information” (Green and Laffont, 1986). In such a setup and with
multiple agents, the revelation principle can be applied if the evidentiary structure (the set of
feasible reports) is strongly normal Bull and Watson (2007).It is straightforward to check that
this condition is satisfied in our model, so we can restrict attention to direct mechanisms.11
A direct mechanism asks each seller to report his type. It specifies the design Di ∈ {D0, Df}
of the good, probabilities ωi with which seller i has to deliver good Di, and transfers ti, paid
by the buyer and received by seller i, i ∈ {1, 2}, that depend on both messages. Because the
11By focusing on single agent problems, Green and Laffont (1986) have shown that in mechanism design
problems with partially verifiable information the Revelation Principle applies if the so-called “Nested Range
Condition (NRC)” is satisfied. This result has been extended to the class of mechanism design problems with n
agents by Bull and Watson (2007). The equivalent to the NRC in the case with n agents is (strong) evidentiary
normality. An evidentiary structure is called strongly normal if (i) there is a report that can be send by any
type (F̃ i = ∅ in our model), and (ii) if a type θ1 can claim to be of type θ2 and type θ2 can claim to be of type
θ3, then also type θ1 can claim to be of type θ3. In our model, a seller can report a flaw only if he observed












). Thus, strong evidentiary normality
is satisfied.
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problem is symmetric we restrict attention to symmetric mechanisms, i.e.
Di = D(F̃ i, F̃ j), ωi = ω(F̃ i, F̃ j) ∈ [0, 1], and ti = t(F̃ i, F̃ j) ∈ R
with j 6= i.
The mechanism designer wants to implement an efficient outcome. This requires:
(i) The specified design is optimal given the available information (efficient design, ED)
D(F̃ 1, F̃ 2) =
{
D0 if F̃
1 = F̃ 2 = ∅
Df otherwise
(ED)
(ii) Production always takes place (efficient production, EP, because the good is sufficiently
valuable to the buyer)
ω(F̃ 1, F̃ 2) + ω(F̃ 2, F̃ 1) = 1 ∀ F̃ 1, F̃ 2 ∈ F (EP)
(iii) An informed seller wants to reveal the state truthfully (incentive compatibility, IC)
q[t(f, f)− ω(f, f)(c+∆c)] + (1− q)[t(f, ∅)− ω(f, ∅)(c+∆c)]
≥ q[t(∅, f)− ω(∅, f)(c+∆c)] + (1− q)[t(∅, ∅)− ω(∅, ∅)(c− (1− α)SR)] (IC)
(iv) Sellers always make non-negative profits because they are protected by limited liability
(LL)
t(F̃ i, F̃ j)− ω(F̃ i, F̃ j) c(D(F̃ 1, F̃ 2)) ≥ 0 ∀ F̃ i, F̃ j ∈ F (LL)
where c(D(F̃ 1, F̃ 2)) = c if F̃ 1 = F̃ 2 = ∅ and c(D(F̃ 1, F̃ 2)) = c+∆c otherwise. Note that (LL)
implies that all sellers voluntarily participate in the mechanism (individual rationality).
We want to find a mechanism that implements the efficient allocation at the lowest possible
cost to the buyer. Thus, the mechanism design problem can be stated as follows:
min
ω(·,·),t(·,·)
2t(∅, ∅)[1− p+ p(1− q)2] + 2t(f, f)pq2 + 2[t(f, ∅) + t(∅, f)]p(1− q)q
subject to (ED), (EP), (IC) and (LL).
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Let u(F̃ i, F̃ j) denote the payoff that supplier i obtains if F̃ i and F̃ j are reported (not
including any additional payoffs from renegotiation at date 2), i.e.
u(F̃ i, F̃ j) ≡ t(F̃ i, F̃ j)− ω(F̃ i, F̃ j)c(D(F̃ i, F̃ j)). (3)
Limited liability is satisfied if and only if for all F̃ i, F̃ j ∈ {∅, f} it holds that u(F̃ i, F̃ j) ≥ 0.
With this notation the incentive constraint can be written as
qu(f, f) + (1 − q)u(f, ∅) ≥ qu(∅, f) + (1 − q)u(∅, ∅) + (1 − q)ω(∅, ∅)(1 − α)SR (IC)
Notice that symmetry together with (EP) implies that ω(∅, ∅) = 1/2. Obviously the buyer has
an incentive to choose u(∅, F̃ j) = 0 for all F̃ j ∈ {∅, f}: Doing so relaxes the (IC) constraint and




2qu(f, f) + 2(1− q)u(f, ∅)
subject to:
qu(f, f) + (1− q)u(f, ∅) ≥ (1− q)(1− α)SR/2 (IC)
u(f, f) ≥ 0, u(f, ∅) ≥ 0 (LL)
Note that (IC) must hold with equality in the optimal solution and that the buyer is indifferent
between all utility vectors that achieve this. Thus, the following pair of payoffs is a solution
to the problem:
u∗(f, f) = 0, u∗(f, ∅) = (1− α)SR/2.
Proposition 2 (Optimal Direct Mechanism). The following efficient direct mechanism indu-
ces each seller of type f to report his type truthfully at the lowest possible cost to the buyer:




, t∗(∅, ∅) =
c
2
D∗(∅, f) = Df , ω
∗(∅, f) = 0, t∗(∅, f) = 0
D∗(f, ∅) = Df , ω
∗(f, ∅) = 1, t∗(f, ∅) = c+∆c+
(1− α)SR
2




, t∗(f, f) =
c+∆c
2
This mechanism is ex post incentive compatible, i.e., it does not depend on the beliefs or higher
order beliefs of the players.
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Note that t∗(∅, ∅) and t∗(f, f) are the expected transfers.12 If both sellers make the same
announcement, each seller gets the contract with probability 0.5. In order to satisfy ex post
limited liability, the seller who produces the good is reimbursed his cost, while the other seller
receives nothing.
The mechanism of Proposition 2 is very intuitive. If one seller reports the flaw while
the other one does not, then the former produces the good with the adjusted design Df and
gets a strictly positive rent, while the latter gets a utility of zero. This rent is necessary to
induce the seller to reveal his information ex ante rather than to wait and renegotiate after
having received the contract. Note that if the seller claims ∅, then – given that the other seller
also claims ∅ – he gets the contract only with probability 1/2. Thus, the rent that has to be
paid is only 1
2
(1− α)SR. With N sellers this rent can be reduced to 1
N
(1− α)SR because the
probability of getting the contract if all sellers report ∅ is only 1/N . If two sellers (or more)
report f , there is no need to pay a rent to these sellers because each of them would receive
the contract with probability zero if he claimed to be of type ∅.
The mechanism of Proposition 2 is not the only mechanism that implements the efficient
allocation at the lowest possible cost to the buyer. In fact, any pair of utilities u(f, f), u(f, ∅) ≥
0 satisfying
qu(f, f) + (1− q)u(f, ∅) = (1− q)(1− α)SR/2 (4)
does the job. However, the mechanism proposed in Proposition 2 is the only one that is ex
post incentive compatible. Thus, no seller has an incentive to change his report after observing
what the other seller has reported. Mechanisms that are ex post incentive compatible have
the desirable feature that they do not depend on the beliefs or higher order beliefs of the
players. Thus, in a model with a richer type space in which players have beliefs about the
beliefs of their opponents, an ex post incentive compatible mechanism implements the desired
allocation no matter how these beliefs look like.13
12The mechanism of Proposition 2 does not implement the efficient allocation in dominant strategies because
it relies on the application of the GNBS off the equilibrium path. Non-cooperative bargaining models that
offer a foundation of the GNBS typically do not have equilibria in dominant strategies.
13See Bergemann and Morris (2005).
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5.2 The Arbitration Mechanism
So far we assumed that the model is common knowledge, in particular that the mechanism
designer knows all the parameters of the problem when she sets up the mechanism. However,
a typical buyer does not have this information. She is not aware of the design flaw, she does
not know the probability that there is a flaw nor the likelihood that any of the sellers is going
to find it, and she does not know how the flaw looks like and how costly it is to fix it. However,
the buyer is aware that she is unaware. She knows that mistakes happen and that they can
be very costly if they are not fixed early. Thus, she would like to prepare for this possibility
and to give incentives to the sellers to reveal possible flaws at date 1 already. We model this
by assuming that neither the buyer nor the sellers know the set of possible flaws F and their
payoff consequences, nor do they have Bayesian priors G(F ) and QF (F̂
1, F̂ 2). The buyer only
knows that there may be a flaw and that sellers may observe it early. However, if a flaw is
pointed out, every industry expert understands it:
Assumption 2 (Eye-Opener). The report of a flaw is an eye-opener: Once the flaw has been
pointed out, all industry experts understand the flaw and its expected payoff consequences.
In the model of Section 5.1 Assumption 2 is a direct implication of Assumption 1 because
the structure of the model is assumed to be common knowledge. Thus, if a flaw is verified, all
involved parties know what the flaw is and what its payoff consequences are. In this section
we assume that the parties do not know the structure of the model. Assumption 2 requires
that if a flaw is pointed out to an industry expert (the buyer, the sellers, or an outside expert),
then the expert understands the flaw with all its relevant implications. This assumption is
reasonable for most technical flaws. For example, the buyer may have overlooked that there
is a technical problem with D0 or that D0 does not comply with some regulation. However,
once this problem has been pointed out, it is often straightforward what has to be done to fix
it. We do not require that industry experts know exactly what the payoff consequences of a
flaw are. We only require that they are symmetrically informed and that they can form an
unbiased estimate.14
14Assumption 2 is reasonable for most design flaws, but it may be more problematic for some design im-
provements. If a design improvement results in an increase of the buyer’s profits, Assumption 2 will often be
satisfied, but if the design improvement increases the buyer’s utility, the assumption is less convincing. For
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If Assumption 2 holds, we can use an indirect mechanism that uses an outside industry
expert as an independent arbitrator. If a seller reveals a flaw to the arbitrator, the arbitrator
understands the flaw and he knows the expected payoff consequences if the flaw is fixed early
rather than late. The buyer can commit ex ante to using such an independent arbitrator and
to follow his verdict. In particular, she can set up the following indirect mechanism that will
be called the Arbitration Mechanism in the following:
1) The buyer publicizes her design proposal D0 and invites all potential sellers to evaluate
the proposal and to report possible design flaws in sealed envelopes to an independent
arbitrator.
2) If there is a design flaw that is reported by at least one seller, the arbitrator evaluates
the flaw and its consequences, i.e. he estimates ∆v, ∆c and ∆x.
3) The contract is determined as follows:
– If none of the sellers reports a design flaw, one of them is selected randomly and
gets the contract to produce D0 and receives payment c.
– If only one seller reports the design flaw, he gets the contract to produce Df and
the payment c+∆c+ (1− α)SR/2 = c+∆c+ (1− α)∆v−∆c−∆x
2
.
– If both sellers report the design flaw, each of them gets the contract to produce Df
and the payment c+∆c with probability 1/2 while the other one gets nothing.
The values of ∆c, ∆x, and ∆c are determined by the independent arbitrator after the
flaw has been reported.
If no flaw was reported but the seller who got the contract observed a flaw, he may
renegotiate the contract with the buyer.
Proposition 3 (Arbitration Mechanism). The Arbitration Mechanism is an efficient mecha-
nism that is cost minimizing for the buyer. It implements the same allocation as the optimal
example, if the design improvement concerns the aesthetic appeal of the product, the buyer may know what
her willingness to pay for the improved design is while the sellers and other industry experts are less well
informed. This gives rise problems of asymmetric information that have to be relegated to future research.
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direct mechanism of Proposition 2. Furthermore, the arbitration mechanism is informationally
robust in the sense that it does not require the ex ante knowledge of p, q, v, ∆v, ∆c and ∆x.
Informational robustness is a highly desirable property of the Arbitration Mechanism. Of
course, the buyer must be aware that there could be a design flaw, but she does not have to
know how this flaw looks like, what payoff consequences it implies, and what the probabilities
p and q are. However, the buyer has to be able to assess her bargaining power α if the initial
contract is renegotiated. Furthermore, the independent arbitrator must be able to assess ∆v,
∆c and ∆x ex post, i.e. after the flaw has been pointed out to her.
6 Multiple Design Flaws and Seller Heterogeneity
In this section we generalize the optimal mechanism derived in Section 5 in two directions.
First, sellers may have different costs which are private information. Second, we allow for
multiple design flaws, i.e. each seller observes some subset F̂ i of the set of actual flaws F .
Efficiency requires that the seller with the lowest cost produces the good and that both sellers
are induced to reveal all flaws that they observed at date 1.
The mechanism design problem is now more intricate. In Section 5 the optimal mechanism
allocates the contract by a coin flip if both producers claim not to have observed any flaw.
This minimizes the information rent that has to be paid to a seller. A random allocation is
efficient, if both sellers have the same cost, but if sellers have different costs, efficiency requires
that the seller with the lower cost gets the contract with probability 1. We show in this section
that this increases the information rent that has to be paid to the seller.
We are now dealing with a multi-dimensional mechanism design problem. Sellers have
to be induced to report both the observed design flaws and their cost parameter truthfully.
In subsection 6.1 we derive an ex post incentive compatible mechanism that implements the
efficient allocation and show that it does so at the lowest possible cost to the buyer. In sub-
section 6.2 we derive an informationally robust indirect mechanism that replicates the optimal
direct mechanism without requiring any ex ante knowledge of the underlying parameters and
probability distributions.
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6.1 The Optimal Mechanism Design Problem
We return to the general model described in Section 3. As in Section 5 we start out assuming
that the mechanism designer knows all parameters of the model, i.e. the set of possible cost
types [
¯
c, c̄], the set of possible flaws F = {f1, . . . , fn}, the costs ∆vk, ∆ck and ∆xk associated
with each potential flaw k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and the (conditional) probability distributions G(F ),
H(c), and QF . In the next subsection we will relax this assumption. Note that the type of
seller i is now multi-dimensional: it consists of a cost type ci and an information type F̂ i (the
set of flaws that seller i observed). Thus, the type of seller i is (ci, F̂ i) ∈ [
¯
c, c̄]× P(F ).
By the revelation principle we can restrict attention to direct mechanisms that ask each
seller i to send a message (c̃i, F̃ i) ∈ [
¯
c, c̄]× P(F ). Put verbally, each seller i reports a cost c̃i
and a set of observed flaws F̃ i. Supplier i is free to report any cost c̃i ∈ [
¯
c, c̄] (i.e. costs cannot
be verified), but he is restricted to report only flaws that he observed. A reported flaw can be
verified, but the seller can always choose not to report some or all of the detected flaws, i.e.
Assumption 1 applies.
The (symmetric) direct mechanism specifies for any announced types ((c̃1, F̃ 1), (c̃2, F̃ 2))
a design D = D((c̃1, F̃ 1), (c̃2, F̃ 2)), a transfer ti = t((c̃i, F̃ i), (c̃j, F̃ j)) paid by the buyer and
received by seller i, and a probability ωi = ω((c̃i, F̃ i), (c̃j, F̃ j)) with which seller i gets the
contract – i.e., with probability ωi seller i has to produce the good, for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j.
The mechanism designer seeks to induce an efficient outcome. The mechanism has to
satisfy the following constraints:
(i) The design is optimal given the available information (efficient design, ED)
D((c1, F̂ 1), (c2, F̂ 2)) = D(F̂ 1 ∪ F̂ 2) (ED)
(ii) The good is produced by the seller with the lowest cost (efficient production, EP)






1 if ci < cj
1/2 if ci = cj
0 if ci > cj
(EP)
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(iii) Sellers make non-negative profits (limited liability, LL)
∀ i ∈ {1, 2}, F̂ i, F̂ j ⊆ F, ci, cj ∈ [
¯
c, c̄] :








Note that (LL) implies that all sellers voluntarily participate in the mechanism (individual
rationality). Finally, we want the mechanism to be ex post incentive compatible (EPIC),
so that no seller wants to change his report once he learns the report of the other seller.
Furthermore, (EPIC) makes sure that the mechanism does not depend on the beliefs or higher
order beliefs of the participants.
(iv) It is ex post optimal for each seller to reveal his type truthfully (ex post incentive
compatibility, EPIC)
∀ i ∈ {1, 2}, F̂ i, F̂ j ⊆ F, and ci, cj ∈ [
¯
c, c̄] :



















+ ω((c̃i, F̃ i), (cj, F̂ j))(1− α)SR(F̂ i, D(F̃ i ∪ F̂ j)) . (EPIC)
Proposition 4 (Efficient Direct Mechanism). The following ex post incentive compatible direct
mechanism implements the efficient allocation; i.e., it satisfies (ED), (EP), (LL), and (EPIC):
D∗((c1, F̂ 1), (c2, F̂ 2)) = D∗(F̂ 1, F̂ 2) = D(F̂ 1 ∪ F̂ 2)






1 if ci < cj
1/2 if ci = cj
0 if ci > cj







+ (1− α)SR(F̂ i, D(F̂ j))
Each seller i has to be induced to report his information F̂ i and his cost ci truthfully.
Note that the direct mechanism of Proposition 4 separates these two problems. It induces
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the seller to report his information F̂ i by paying him (1 − α)SR(F̂ i, D(F̂ j)) if he reports F̂ i.
This is exactly the rent that seller i can obtain by revealing F̂ i ex post – at the renegotiation
stage – rather than ex ante. It induces the seller to report his cost truthfully by allocating the
contract to him if he reports the lower cost at a price that is equal to the cost of the second
lowest bidder (as in a Vickrey auction). Thus, the mechanism is ex post incentive compatible:
no seller has an incentive to revise his decision after learning the announcement c̃j, F̃ j of the
other seller.
It is useful to compare this mechanism to the mechanism of Proposition 2. Suppose that
there is at most one flaw and this flaw is reported by seller i but not by seller j. Then,
according to the mechanism of Proposition 4, seller i obtains a rent of (1− α)SR.15 This rent
is larger than the rent 1
2
(1− α)SR, which was paid by the direct mechanism of Proposition 2.
The reason is that in Proposition 2 the contract was allocated randomly if both sellers claim
to be of type ∅, while the mechanism of Proposition 4 must allocate the contract to the seller
with the lowest cost.
An important question is whether the buyer can reduce the information rent of a seller
who observed one or more flaws? If the mechanism designer knows all the probability distri-
butions, in particular the distribution of cost types H, and if she is satisfied with Bayesian
Implementation, then the answer is yes. For the sake of the argument, consider the scenario
with at most one flaw. Suppose seller i observed the flaw and has relatively high cost. In
order to obtain the contract with a high probability – and then being able to profit from
renegotiation – seller i has to under-report his cost significantly. This, however, is costly to
seller i. Suppose seller j reports his cost cj < ci truthfully. Thus, the ex post utility of seller i
from obtaining the contract and concealing the flaw is (1− α)SR − (ci − cj). In other words,
the higher the cost type, the lower the incentive of a seller to conceal the flaw. Thus, the
transfer a seller obtains for revealing the flaw could be reduced by making it contingent on
the announced costs (ci, cj). However, such a mechanism is not ex post incentive compatible
and it requires that the distribution of cost types is common knowledge.
The next proposition shows that among all ex post incentive compatible mechanisms the
direct mechanism of Proposition 4 is indeed optimal.
15In this case we have F = {∅, {f}} and (with slight abuse of notation) can define SR := SR(f,D0).
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Proposition 5 (Optimal Mechanism). The mechanism of Proposition 4 is optimal, i.e. there
does not exist any other ex post incentive compatible direct mechanism that implements the
efficient outcome at a lower cost for the buyer.
6.2 The Extended Arbitration Mechanism
The mechanism of Proposition 4 assumes that the model is common knowledge, in particular
that the buyer knows all the parameters of the problem when she designs the optimal revelation
mechanism. However, if the Eye-Opener Assumption 2 holds, this knowledge is not necessary.
An extended version of the Arbitration Mechanism introduced in Section 4.2 implements the
same allocation as the optimal mechanism of Proposition 4 and does not require that the
buyer knows anything about the nature or the payoff consequences of possible flaws, nor does
she have to know the probability distributions over the realization of these flaws and over the
costs of the seller. However, the buyer has to be aware that flaws are possible and she has to
be able to commit to using an independent arbitrator who understands the flaws once they
have been pointed out to her. The arbitrator can be instructed to determine payments ex post
(after flaws have been revealed) such that they give rise to the same payoffs as the mechanism
of Proposition 4. The Extended Arbitration Mechanism is defined as follows:
1) The buyer publicizes her initial design proposal D0 and invites all potential sellers to
evaluate the proposal and to report possible design flaws in sealed envelopes to an
independent arbitrator.
2) Let F̃ i denote the set of flaws reported by seller i ∈ {1, 2}. The arbitrator evaluates all
flaws fk ∈ F̃ ≡ F̃
1 ∪ F̃ 2 and their potential consequences, i.e., for any reported flaw fk
she estimates ∆vk, ∆ck and xk. She awards the following reward to each seller i:
T i1(F̃
i, F̃ j) = (1− α)SR(F̃ i, D(F̃ j)) (5)
3) The buyer uses the information on the reported design flaws F̃ = F̃ i∪ F̃ j to redesign the
good to D(F̃ ), and then runs a sealed-bid, second-price auction. Each seller i ∈ {1, 2}
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bj if bi < bj
bj/2 if bi = bj
0 if bi > bj
. (6)
If both sellers place the same bid b1 = b2 = b, one seller is selected at random and
obtains the contract at price b.
4) If seller i got the contract and if he observed design flaws fk that have not been revealed
to the buyer at stage 1, he may renegotiate the contract with the buyer.
Proposition 6 (Extended Arbitration Mechanism). If Assumption 2 holds, the Extended
Arbitration Mechanism is an efficient mechanism that is informationally robust in the sense
that it is ex post incentive compatible and it does not require any prior knowledge of the
set of possible flaws F , with ∆vk, ∆ck and ∆xk for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and the probability
distributions G, QF and H. There does not exist any other informationally robust mechanism
that implements the efficient allocation at a lower cost to the buyer.
The Extended Arbitration Mechanism is a two-stage mechanism that separates the pro-
blems of (i) inducing sellers to reveal observed design flaws early, and (ii) allocating the
contract to the seller with the lowest cost. This separation is necessary if the buyer wants
to implement an efficient allocation. However, if the buyer does not want to implement the
efficient allocation but rather wants to maximize her expected profits, she may want to tie the
allocation of the contract to the revelation of design flaws (e.g. by offering bonus points that
create an advantage in the auction for sellers who reveal flaws early) in order to reduce the
rent that has to be paid to sellers. But, of course, this comes at the price that the allocation
is inefficient with positive probability.
The Extended Arbitration Mechanism requires the commitment of the buyer to pay sellers
for the information on design flaws that they provide. The simplest and most transparent way
to do this is the use of an independent third party. However, there are also other ways
how this commitment can be achieved. For example, if the buyer frequently procures similar
projects, i.e., if she is in a repeated relationship with the sellers, and if the allocation procedure
is fully transparent, then she may be able to credibly commit to paying out T i1(F̃i, F̃j) =
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(1− α)SR(F̃i, D(F̃j)) herself. If parties are sufficiently patient, this commitment is sustained
by the threat of the sellers not to reveal any design flaws in the future if the buyer ever reneges
on her promise.
7 Incentives to Invest in Finding Design Flaws
So far, we assumed that sellers receive the signal about design flaws for free. In reality finding
flaws requires effort and other costly resources. Thus, the question arises whether the Extended
Arbitration Mechanism provides optimal incentives to invest into finding flaws.
We analyze the investment incentives of the two sellers for the baseline model with at
most one flaw; i.e., F = {∅, {f}}. The flaw exists with probability p ∈ (0, 1). If the flaw
exists and is detected and revealed ex ante, this creates a social surplus of S = ∆v − ∆c.
If the flaw is revealed only at the renegotiation stage, the social surplus is reduced to SR =
∆v −∆c−∆x > 0.
Each seller i can invest resources in order to increase the probability of detecting the
flaw (if it exists). The probability of detecting the flaw if it exists is q when seller i invests
the amount φi(q), where φi(·) is strictly increasing and convex. Given the flaw exists, the
detection probabilities are assumed to be uncorrelated across sellers.
Recall that the Extended Arbitration Mechanism separates the problems of inducing
sellers to reveal flaws and of allocating the contract to the most efficient seller. Thus, we
can focus on the profits a seller obtains from detecting and revealing the flaw. The expected
profit of seller i under the Extended Arbitration Mechanism (ignoring potential profits from
production) is
πi(qi) = pqi(1− q̂j)(1− α)SR − φi(qi), (7)
where q̂j with j 6= i is the investment that seller i expects his competitor j to make. In the
Nash Equlibrium of the investment game seller i chooses
qiN ∈ argmax
qi
pqi(1− q̂j)(1− α)SR − φi(qi) (8)
Consider now the problem of a social planner who can choose q1 and q2 in order to
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maximize social welfare
W (q1, q2) = p(q1 + q2 − q1q2)S − φ1(q1)− φ2(q2). (9)
The welfare optimal investments are
(q1∗, q2∗) ∈ argmax
q1,q2
W (q1, q2). (10)
We assume that there exists a unique welfare maximizing tuple of investment levels (q1∗, q2∗) ≫
0.
The welfare maximizing investment levels do not coincide with the investment levels that
sellers choose in Nash equilibrium. Suppose seller 1 expects that seller 2 invests efficiently.
Then the investment level of seller 1 must solve p(1− q2∗)(1−α)SR = dφ1/dq1. However, the
welfare optimal investment level q1∗ solves the following first-order condition p(1 − q2∗)S =
dφ1/dq1. Thus, given that seller 2 invests efficiently, seller 1 has an incentive to invest too
little. The reason is that with the Extended Arbitration Mechanism seller i receives less than
the social value generated by his efforts. He receives only share (1−α) < 1 of the renegotiation
surplus, which is the social surplus reduced by the cost of renegotiation. Thus, the Extended
Arbitration Mechanism induces sellers to underinvest into finding design flaws. This problem
can be fixed by replacing T i1 in the Extended Arbitration Mechanism by the full social surplus
S; i.e., if seller i reports the flaw and seller j reports nothing, seller i obtains a payment of S
and nothing otherwise. Now, the expected profit of seller i amounts to
πi(qi) = pqi(1− q̂j)S − φi(qi) (11)
Proposition 7 (Investment Incentives). Suppose the Arbitration Mechanism specifies T̂ i1(f, ∅) =
S and T̂ i1(f, f) = T̂
i
1(∅, f) = T̂
i
1(∅, ∅) = 0. This mechanism induces both sellers to reveal their
information truthfully, it allocates the contract to the seller with the lowest cost, and it induces
both sellers to invest efficiently; i.e., (q1, q2) = (q1∗, q2∗).
The mechanism proposed by Proposition 7 is essentially a Groves mechanism: Each seller
is made residual claimant for his contribution to the social surplus. It is interesting to note
that the mechanisms of Sections 5 and 6 are not Groves mechanisms. They do not pay each
seller his marginal contribution to the social surplus, but rather the increase of his outside
option utility.
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The mechanism of Proposition 7 implements the efficient investment levels in Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. It does not require that the buyer knows the investment cost functions. Each
seller, however, has to be able to anticipate the behavior of the other seller correctly. Thus,
each seller has to know his competitor’s investment cost functions. Furthermore, efficiency
requires that the sellers know the likelihood that a flaw exists and what the payoff consequences
of the flaw are.
The question of how to incentivize sellers to search for flaws efficiently raises many ad-
ditional interesting questions. For example, it may be optimal to limit the number of sellers
who are incentivized to search for flaws, or it may be optimal to let sellers search sequentially
in order not to duplicate search efforts. However, all of these design choices require a detailed
knowledge of what sellers are searching for, i.e. the buyer must know the parameters of the
model and the underlying probability distributions. This is why these problems are beyond
the scope of this paper.
8 Conclusions
An important problem for real world mechanism design is the fact that the mechanism de-
signer is often unaware of some possible contingencies. An experienced mechanism designer
understands that she may have overlooked something (she is “aware that she is unaware”), but
she does not know what it is that she has overlooked. The traditional mechanism design lite-
rature ignores this problem by assuming that “the model” is common knowledge. All involved
parties know what the possible states of the world are, and they know the probability distri-
butions with which nature determines the actual state (including the information structure).
Following Wilson (1987) the literature on “robust implementation” focuses on mechanisms
that do not depend on the probability distributions, i.e. on the beliefs and higher-order beliefs
of the involved parties. Our paper goes one step further. We allow for the possibility that the
mechanism designer has only partial knowledge of the physical state-space, i.e. she is unaware
of some contingencies. Therefore, it is impossible for her to describe these contingencies in a
contract or mechanism ex ante.
We have shown that, nevertheless, the mechanism designer can implement the efficient
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allocation if the revelation of the state of the world is an eye-opener, i.e., once the state has
been pointed out, every expert understands the state and its payoff consequences. In this case
the mechanism designer can appoint an expert as an independent arbitrator who verifies the
state and completes the contract ex post according to a general rule that does not require
the ex ante knowledge of the state space. In the procurement context this is a reasonable
assumption. The buyer is often unaware of possible design flaws, but once a flaw has been
pointed out it is often obvious to every industry expert what the flaw is, how it has to be
fixed, and what the payoff consequences are. By using the Extended Arbitration Mechanism
the buyer can induce sellers to reveal all observed design flaws early and she can implement the
efficient allocation. We belief that this approach deserves further attention in other contexts
as well. For example, courts of arbitration are frequently used in labor and trade disputes.
They often verify the state of the world ex post and assign payments according to rules that
have been specified in very general terms ex ante. An important question is how these rules
should be designed to induce efficient behavior.
One potential problem of the Extended Arbitration Mechanism is collusion. A seller who
reports a set of flaws is not rewarded for all flaws that he detected, but only for those that
have not been reported by other sellers. Thus, if sellers coordinated their reports so that no
flaw is reported by more than one seller, they could all benefit. In some sense this is the same
problem of collusion that arises in any auction. However, there is an interesting twist to it
that makes collusion more difficult in our setup. In order to coordinate their behavior each
seller has to point out the flaws that he observed to the other seller. Suppose that seller 1
observed a flaw that seller 2 did not observe. By pointing out the flaw to seller 2, seller 1 gives
away his information. Seller 2 may now claim that he also observed the flaw and threaten to
reveal it to the buyer in order to obtain concessions from seller 1 in the collusion game. An
interesting question for future research is to model this in more detail and to ask whether the
mechanism can be modified to make collusion more difficult.
The Extended Arbitration Mechanism separates the problem of inducing sellers to report
design flaws early and assigning the contract to the seller with the lowest cost. This separation
is necessary to achieve efficiency. However if the buyer is not interested in implementing the
efficient allocation but rather in maximizing profits, separation need no longer be optimal. In
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this case the buyer may be able to increase her expected profits by tying the assignment of the
contract to the revelation of flaws, e.g. by offering “bonus points” in the auction in exchange
for pointing out design improvements. In fact, this is what is sometimes observed in private
procurement contexts. Note, however, that in order to design the mechanism optimally, the
buyer needs to know the probabilities of possible flaws and their payoff consequences. If
she does not know this, she may get it wrong which can be very costly if sellers keep the
information on design flaws to themselves. Thus, even for a profit maximizing buyer the
Extended Arbitration Mechanism is attractive: It allows the buyer to reap all the benefits
from inducing sellers to report design flaws early, and the rents that the buyer has to pay to
sellers do not exceed the rents that she would have paid if she had used a price-only auction.
30
A Appendix
Proof of Observation 1. The proof focuses on the incentives of a seller to reveal the flaw. The
bidding strategies in the second-price auction can be shown to be optimal by applying standard
arguments.
Consider the case where there is a design flaw and seller 1 observed it. If the flaw was
reported at date 1, there is no scope for renegotiation at date 2. In this case it is a weakly
dominant strategy for each seller i to bid b(ci, {f}) = ci. Seller 1’s expected profit if he reveals
the flaw (REV) is given by
Π1(REV ) = Prob[c1 ≤ c2] · E[c2 − c1 | c1 ≤ c2]. (A.1)
Alternatively, seller 1 could conceal the information, hope that he wins the auction, then
report the flaw at date 2 and renegotiate. If he manages to get the contract and to renegotiate
it, his payoff from renegotiation is given by (1−α)[∆v−∆x] = (1−α)SR. Thus, if he conceals
the flaw, it is a weakly dominant strategy for seller 1 to bid b(c1, {f}) = c1 − (1−α)SR in the
auction at date 1.16 Let q′ denote the probability that seller 2 also observed the flaw given
that seller 2 did not inform the buyer about it. Clearly, q′ ≤ q. With probability q′ seller 2
bids b(c2, {f}) = c2 − (1 − α)SR, with probability 1 − q′ he bids b(c2, ∅) = c2.17 Thus, the
expected payoff of seller 1 if he conceals the flaw (CON) is given by
Π1(CON) = q′Prob
[




























c2 − c1 + (1− α)SR | c1 − (1− α)SR ≤ c2
]
> Π1(REV ) (A.2)
The strict inequality follows from q′ ≤ q < 1, Prob[c1 − (1− α)SR ≤ c2] > Prob[c1 ≤ c2] and
E
[
c2 − c1 + (1− α)SR | c1 − (1− α)SR ≤ c2
]
> E[c2 − c1 | c1 ≤ c2].
16Note that this strategy is weakly dominant given the reduced form outcome of the renegotiation game.
17If seller 2 did not observe any flaw, he may still expect that there is a flaw with positive probability.
However, as long as he does not know the flaw, this is of no relevance to him. The flaw will become apparent
at date 3 only, when the initial contract expires and the contractor has no advantage over other sellers anymore.
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Proof of Proposition 1. The result is shown in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 2. We have shown in the text above that the proposed mechanism sa-
tisfies all constraints and minimizes the expected cost of the buyer. Note that it is weakly
optimal for each seller to report his type truthfully no matter what the announced type of his
opponent is. Thus, the mechanism is ex post incentive compatible.
Proof of Proposition 3. The Arbitration Mechanism gives rise to the same monetary outcomes
and the same incentives for each seller as the mechanism of Proposition 2. Thus, given that
it is an equilibrium in the direct mechanism for each seller to reveal the design flaw early, it is
also an equilibrium in the Arbitration Mechanism. The mechanism is informationally robust
because it is independent of the probabilities p and q and because the reward for reporting a
design flaw is determined ex post by the independent arbitrator.
Proof of Proposition 4. The above mechanism obviously satisfies (ED), (EP), and (LL).18
Using the expression for the transfer payments, (EPIC) can be written as
ω∗(ci, cj)[cj − ci] + (1− α)SR(F̂ i, D(F̂ j)) ≥
ω∗(c̃i, cj)[cj − ci + (1− α)SR(F̂ i, D(F̃ i ∪ F̂ j))] + (1− α)SR(F̃ i, D(F̂ j)) (A.3)
for all c̃i ∈ [
¯
c, c̄], F̃ i ⊆ F̂ i. First, note that




∆vk −∆ck −∆xk +
∑





∆vk −∆ck −∆xk = S
R(F̂ i, D(F̂ j)). (A.4)
18Note again that t∗ is the expected transfer payment. If ci = cj each seller gets the contract with





R(F̂ i, D(F̂ j)) if seller i gets the contract and (1−α)SR(F̂ i, D(F̂ j)) other-
wise.
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Using (A.4), (A.3) reduces to
ω∗(ci, cj)[cj − ci] ≥ ω∗(c̃i, cj)[cj − ci] − [1 − ω∗(c̃i, cj)](1 − α)SR(F̂ i, D(F̃ i ∪ F̂ j)) (A.5)
for all c̃i ∈ [
¯
c, c̄], F̃ i ⊆ F̂ i.
Thus, given that ω∗ ≤ 1 it never pays off for a seller to misreport the observed flaws. The
remaining question is whether a seller can benefit from misreporting his cost. Given that the
set of observed flaws is revealed truthfully, inequality (A.5) simplifies to
ω∗(ci, cj)[cj − ci] ≥ ω∗(c̃i, cj)[cj − ci] ∀c̃i ∈ [
¯
c, c̄]. (A.6)
If ci < cj, we have ω∗(ci, cj) = 1, so misreporting cannot be beneficial. If ci > cj, we have
ω∗(ci, cj) = 0, so misreporting can lead to seller i getting the contract but this is not in seller
i’s interest because [cj − ci] < 0. For the knife-edge case cj = ci, seller i is indifferent between
all potential cost reports – i.e., reporting truthfully is a best response.
Proof of Proposition 5. The optimal mechanism design problem of the buyer is given by:
min
t(·,·)
E[t((c1, F̂ 1), (c2, F̂ 2)) + t((c2, F̂ 2), (c1, F̂ 1))] (A.7)
subject to:
D((c1, F̂ 1), (c2, F̂ 2)) = D(F̂ 1, F̂ 2) = D(F̂ 1 ∪ F̂ 2) (ED)






1 if c1 < c2
1/2 if c1 = c2
0 if c1 > c2
(EP)

























{k|fk∈F̂ 1\(F̃ 1∪F̂ 2)}
(1− α)SRk
All constraints have to hold for both sellers and for all seller types.
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Efficient Design (ED) and Efficient Production (EP) imply directly
D∗((c1, F̂ 1), (c2, F̂ 2)) = D∗(F̂ 1, F̂ 2) = D(F̂ 1 ∪ F̂ 2)
ω∗((ci, F̂ i), (cj, F̂ j)) = ω∗(ci, cj) =
{
1 if ci < cj
0 if ci > cj
Consider now the implications of Ex Post Incentive Compatibility (EPIC) by focusing on the
incentives of seller 1 to misreport his type (the incentives of seller 2 are symmetric). (EPIC)
requires that for all (c1, F̂ 1) ∈ [
¯
c, c̄] × P(F) and for all (c2, F̂ 2) ∈ [
¯
c, c̄] × P(F) it must hold
that:

















{k|fk∈F̂ 1\(F̃ 1∪F̂ 2)}
(1− α)SRk
(EPIC)
In the following, we derive conditions on transfers that need to be satisfied so that seller 1 has
no incentive to misreport his type. We have to distinguish four cases.
Case (i) [c1 < c2 and c̃1 < c2]: Seller 1 is more efficient than seller 2. He must have no
incentive to misreport his type by claiming to have a different cost c̃1 6= c1 such that he is still
selected as the contractor. This is the case iff









{k|fk∈F̂ 1\(F̃ 1∪F̂ 2)}
(1− α)SRk
for all c̃1 < c2 and all F̃ 1 ⊆ F̂ 1. Rearranging yields
t(c1, F̂ 1, ·)− t(c̃1, F̃ 1, ·) ≥
∑
{k|fk∈F̂ 1\(F̃ 1∪F̂ 2)}
[




∀c1, c̃1 < c2, F̃
1 ⊆ F̂ 1. (A.8)
Case (ii) [c1 < c2 and c̃1 > c2]: If Seller 1 is more efficient than seller 2 it must also be the
case that he has no incentive to report to be less efficient than seller 2, which is the case iff




1 < c2, c̃1 > c2, F̃
1 ⊆ F̂ 1. (A.9)
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Case (iii) [c1 > c2 and c̃1 > c2]: Seller 1 is less efficient than seller 2. He must have no
incentive to report c̃1 6= c1 such that he is still less efficient. In this case (EPIC) reduces to
t(c1, F̂ 1, ·)− t(c̃1, F̃ 1, ·) ≥ 0 ∀c1, c̃1 > c2, F̃ 1 ⊆ F̂ 1. (A.10)
The reverse condition has to hold to deter type c̃1 from reporting to be type c1. Furthermore
these conditions have to hold for all F̂ 1 and F̃ 1 ⊆ F̂ 1, so in particular for F̃ 1 = F̂ 1. Thus,
different types of seller 1 that report the same set of flaws and have different costs that are
both higher than the cost of seller 2 must receive the same transfer: For all c1, c̃1 so that
ω(c1, ·) = ω(c̃1, ·) = 0 we must have
t(c1, F̂ 1, ·) = t(c̃1, F̂ 1, ·) ∀F̂ 1, ∀c1, c̃1 > c2. (A.11)
Case (iv) [c1 > c2 and c̃1 < c2]: If seller 1 is less efficient than seller 2 he must not have an
incentive to report to be more efficient. The (EPIC) constraint in this case is equivalent to










{k|fk∈F̂ 1\(F̃ 1∪F̂ 2)}
(1− α)SRk ∀c
1 > c2, c̃1 < c2, F̃
1 ⊆ F̂ 1.(A.12)
We now turn to the limited liability constraint (LL). Suppose the seller reports F̃ 1 = ∅.
Reducing t(c̃1, ∅, ·) relaxes (EPIC), so the buyer wants to reduce the transfer until the (LL)
constraint holds with equality. Thus, if c̃1 < c2 it is optimal to set




Using this in inequality (A.8) for F̃ 1 = ∅ yields
t(c1, F̂ 1, ·) ≥ t(c̃1, ∅, ·) +
∑
{k|fk∈F̂ 1\F̂ 2}


















(1− α)SRk . (A.13)
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This inequality must hold for all c̃1 arbitrarily close to c2. Thus, a necessary condition for ex
post incentive compatibility to hold for a type (c1, F̂ 1) with c1 < c2 is:







1 < c2. (A.14)
Now suppose that c̃1 < c2 and F̃ 1 = ∅. Again, t(c̃1, ∅, ·) satisfies (LL) with equality if




Using this in inequality (A.12) yields











1, c̃1 > c2. (A.15)
Inequality (A.15) must hold for any c̃1 arbitrarily close to c2 which implies




1 > c2, ǫ ≥ 0. (A.16)
Furthermore, by (A.11) it has to hold that t(c1, F̂ 1, ·) = t(c̃1, F̂ 1, ·) for all c1, c̃1 > c2; i.e.,
if the seller does not execute production, his transfer is independent of the reported cost type.
Hence, a necessary condition for ex post incentive compatibility is




1 > c2. (A.17)
The next result follows immediately from equations (A.14) and (A.17).
Lemma 1. Consider a mechanism satisfying constraints (EPIC), (EP), (ED), and (LL).
Then, the transfer schedule must satisfy
















If we extend (A.18) to c1 = c2, the ex post utility of seller 1 with cost type c1 = c2 is
the same, irrespective of whether he has to produce the good and the transfer is given by the
lower bound of the term for c1 < c2 or he does not obtain the contract and the transfer is
given by the lower bound of the term for c1 > c2.
The mechanism of Proposition 4 satisfies (ED), (EP), (LL) and (EPIC), and it satisfies the
condition provided in Lemma 1 with equality. Thus, this mechanism implements the efficient
allocation at the lowest possible transfers, i.e. at the lowest possible cost to the buyer.
Proof of Proposition 6. The Extended Arbitration Mechanism gives rise to the same monetary
outcomes and the same incentives for each seller as the mechanism of Proposition 4. Thus,
given that it is an equilibrium in the direct mechanism for each seller to reveal all observed
design flaws early, it is also an equilibrium in the Extended Arbitration Mechanism. Furt-
hermore, given that all observed flaws have been revealed it is optimal for each seller to bid
his true cost in the sealed-bid, second-price auction. Hence, with the Extended Arbitration
Mechanism the total payment that seller i receives is given by
T i1 + T
i
2 = (1− α)S




















if ci = cj
0 if ci > cj
, (A.19)
where T i1 + T
i
2 denotes the expected total payment. As the mechanism of Proposition 4, the
Extended Arbitration Mechanism is ex post incentive compatible. Furthermore, it does not
require any ex ante knowledge knowledge of the parameters of the model, if Assumption 2
holds. Finally, by Proposition 5 and the revelation principle there does not exist any other
informationally robust mechanism that implements the efficient allocation at a lower cost to
the buyer.
Proof of Proposition 7. By the definition and the uniqueness of the welfare optimal investment
levels, we can write
qi∗ = argmax
qi
W (qi, qj∗) = argmax
qi
{
p(qi + qj∗ − qiqj∗)S − φi(qi)− φj(qj∗)
}
, (A.20)
for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j.
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If seller i expects that seller j invests efficiently – i.e., qj = qj∗, then the expected profit
of i is
πi(qi) = pqi(1− q̂j∗)S − φi(qi). (A.21)
The above expression is maximized at the investment level given in equation (A.20). Hence,
investing efficiently is a mutually best response, which completes the proof.
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